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Navigating the Cybersecurity Act of 2015
Jasper L. Tran*
INTRODUCTION
The year 2014 was known as “the year of the cyber breach.”1
The year 2015 was not much different. High profile cyberattacks
have been “a main topic of conversation in the boardroom and at
the dinner table.”2 Every day, hackers target American
businesses for purposes of cyberespionage and theft, stealing
intellectual property, trade secrets, and sensitive government
information.3
Congress slowly responded with several cybersecurity bills
from both the House of Representatives and the Senate.4 Most
notably, the Senate introduced the Cybersecurity Information
Sharing Act (“CISA” or S. 754),5 while the House introduced the
Protecting Cyber Networks Act (“PCNA” or H.R. 1560).6 These
bills share the same purpose: creating a pathway enabling
private entities to share cyber information. How to share cyber
information is what distinguishes the bills from one another. For
instance, PCNA allows the private sector to share cyber
information with the federal government but not through the
NSA or the Department of Defense (“DOD”). On the other hand,
CISA seeks to enhance and provide liability protections for
information sharing between corporate entities, between
corporate entities and the government, and between different
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* Humphrey Policy Fellow, Google Policy Fellow. Sincere thanks to Tom Bell, Jeff
Kosseff, Scott Schakelford, Denis Binder, Stephen Flores, Mike Hornak, David Groshoff,
Drew Simshaw and other participants of the 2016 Symposium of the Chapman Law
Review for their thoughtful comments. All views expressed herein are mine only, not
those of my employer, sponsor, or affiliates. Contact me at tran4lr@gmail.com.
1 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE,
THE PROTECTING CYBER NETWORKS ACT (H.R. 1560) (2015), http://intelligence.house.gov/
sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/new%20bill%20summary%20pdf.pdf [http://
perma.cc/2FW8-9EUR].
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 See, e.g., Cyber Information Sharing Act, S. 754, 114th Cong. (2015); Cyber Threat
Sharing Act of 2015, S. 456, 114th Cong. (2015); Protecting Cyber Networks Act, H.R.
1560, 114th Cong. (2015). See generally infra Parts I, II.
5 See infra Section I.B.1.
6 See infra Section II.B.1.
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government agencies. This Article discusses these two bills in
detail in Parts I and II.
As Congress considered the legislation, the President issued
Executive
Order
13636,7
entitled
“Improving
Critical
Infrastructure Cybersecurity,”8 directing the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) to develop a “voluntary
framework . . . for reducing cyber risks to critical infrastructure.”9
Accordingly, the NIST released a framework (“NIST Framework”)
in February 2014,10 sharing many similar provisions of CISA and
PCNA on information sharing.11 This Article discusses Executive
Order 13636 in Part III.
Given the federal government’s strong interest in
implementing
a
new
cybersecurity
information-sharing
framework, CISA and PCNA, along with other cybersecurity
bills, were combined into the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 (“CA’15”),
discussed in detail in Part IV. The NIST Framework following
Executive Order 13636 is already in place. Part V discusses my
initial concerns about CA’15, and ethical implications and
recommendations for practicing attorneys.
I. FROM THE SENATE: THE CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION
SHARING ACT
A.
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Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 19, 2013).
Executive Order -- Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, WHITE HOUSE
(Feb. 12, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/executive-orderimproving-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity [http://perma.cc/8Z8X-TRQT] [hereinafter
WHITE HOUSE’S Executive Order].
9 Executive Order 13636: Cybersecurity Framework, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH.
(Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/ [http://perma.cc/E44P-WLXY].
10 Id.
11 See generally WHITE HOUSE’S Executive Order, supra note 8.
12 Remarks by the President on Securing Our Nation’s Cyber Infrastructure, WHITE
HOUSE (May 29, 2009), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-presidentsecuring-our-nations-cyber-infrastructure [http://perma.cc/DNH4-DJW6].
13 Siobhan Gorman, Annual U.S. Cybercrime Costs Estimated at $100 Billion, WALL
ST. J. (July 13, 2013, 6:49 PM), http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732
4328904578621880966242990.
7
8
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CISA’s History
In 2009, President Barack Obama declared that the “cyber
threat is one of the most serious economic and national security
challenges we face as a nation,” and recognized that the United
States is “not as prepared as we should be, as a government or as
a country.”12 In 2013, the Center for Strategic and International
Studies conducted a study and concluded that cybercrime costs
the United States roughly $100 billion annually.13 In 2014,
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PricewaterhouseCoopers surveyed and found that 69% of U.S.
executives worry about the impact of cyberthreats to their
company’s growth, as compared to 49% of global executives who
reported the same concern.14
From 2006 to 2015, incidents of loss, theft, and exposure of
personally identifiable information increased by 1100%.15 There
were 3207 reported incidents of data breaches in 2012 and 813
million records exposed in 2013.16 The year 2014 alone accounts
for 67,168 cyber incidents against federal agencies, 27,624 of
which involved personally identifiable information.17 In 2015, the
U.S. Office of Personnel Management suffered the theft of
personal information18 of 4.2 million current and former federal
employees, and of 19.7 million applicants for background
investigations.19 These numbers only account for known incidents
released to the public—the real numbers are likely much higher.
The threats are escalating,20 calling for a nationwide security
reform. The Senate responded by introducing CISA to enhance
and provide liability protections for information sharing between
corporate entities, between corporate entities and the government,
and between different government agencies.21
CISA first appeared in the 113th Congress on July 10, 2014,
as S. 2588, introduced by Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA).22 It

05/09/2016 12:16:02
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14 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
U.S. CYBERCRIME: RISING RISKS, REDUCED
READINESS 5 (2014), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/increasing-it-effectiveness/publications/
assets/2014-us-state-of-cybercrime.pdf [http://perma.cc/UJ85-WMMF].
15 S. 754 – Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, SENATE REPUBLICAN
POL’Y COMMITTEE (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.rpc.senate.gov/legislative-notices/s-754_
cybersecurity-information-sharing-act-of-2015 [http://perma.cc/GAC5-M8GA] [hereinafter
SENATE REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMMITTEE].
16 Fred Donovan, Confirmed: 2014 Is the Worst Year Ever for Data Breaches, FIERCE
IT SECURITY (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.fierceitsecurity.com/story/confirmed-2014-worstyear-ever-data-breaches/2014-11-20 [http://perma.cc/H7AS-73WK].
17 Andrea Peterson, This Terrifying Chart Explains Why Cybersecurity Is Such a Big
Problem for the Government, WASH. POST (June 18, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/06/18/this-terrifying-chart-explains-why-cybersecurityis-such-a-big-problem-for-the-government/ [http://perma.cc/BFJ2-5PNY].
18 Such personal information includes full name, birth date, home address, and
Social Security numbers. Cybersecurity Resource Center: Cybersecurity Incidents, U.S.
OFF. PERSONNEL MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/#
WhatHappened [http://perma.cc/Z3N7-YMKW].
19 Id. The 19.7 million figure does not include an additional “1.8 million
non-applicants, primarily spouses or co-habitants of applicants.” Id.
20 See SENATE REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMMITTEE, supra note 15. In fact, cybersecurity
experts warn that a very big cyber attack is coming, predictably affecting everyone in
America “and we don’t even know it.” Christopher Mims, The Hacked Data Broker? Be
Very Afraid, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-hacked-databroker-be-very-afraid-1441684860.
21 See generally infra Section I.B.1.
22 S.2588 – Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2014, CONGRESS.GOV, https://
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passed the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by a 12–3
vote, but did not reach a full senate vote before the end of the
congressional session.23 CISA reappeared again in the 114th
Congress on March 12, 2015, as S. 754 by Senator Richard Burr
(R-NC) and passed the Senate Intelligence Committee by a 14–1
vote.24 S. 754 combines two Senate bills: CISA, and S. 456, the
Cyber Threat Sharing Act of 2015 (“CTSA”).25
B.

CISA in Detail
It is important to note that CISA is strictly voluntary, i.e.,
there is no duty to share.26 It expressly prohibits the federal
government from coercing parties into sharing.27 It also provides
a safe harbor for participating entities, when they share
information according to CISA’s provisions; CISA does not shield
entities from potential liability for failing to act. Parties taking
advantage of CISA could use defensive measures, but they are
prohibited from hacking back (i.e., harming a third party’s
system).28 Furthermore, shared information can be used to
prosecute cybercrimes and as evidence for crimes involving
physical force.29
1. CISA’s Notable Provisions30
CISA’s purpose is “[t]o improve cybersecurity in the United
States through enhanced sharing of information about

05/09/2016 12:16:02
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www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2588?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%2
2%5C%22s2588%5C%22%22%5D%7D&resultIndex=2 [http://perma.cc/EQE6-8UVS].
23 See Gregory S. McNeal, Controversial Cybersecurity Bill Known as CISA Advances
out of Senate Committee, FORBES (July 9, 2014, 6:55 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
gregorymcneal/2014/07/09/controversial-cybersecurity-bill-known-as-cisa-advances-out-ofsenate-committee/ [http://perma.cc/7A3V-G6GS].
24 See Andy Greenberg, CISA Cybersecurity Bill Advances Despite Privacy Concerns,
WIRED (Mar. 12, 2015, 7:18 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/03/cisa-cybersecurity-billadvances-despite-privacy-critiques/ [http://perma.cc/L3A7-WGU3].
25 Taylor Armerding, Cybersecurity Legislation Still Draws Intense Opposition, CIO
(Sept. 23, 2015, 7:08 AM), http://www.cio.com/article/2985469/security/cybersecuritylegislation-still-draws-intense-opposition.html [http://perma.cc/A77Z-MVNP].
26 Patrick Eddington, OPM, CISA, and the Cybersecurity Oxymoron, JUST SECURITY
(July 2, 2015, 10:08 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/24360/opm-cisa-cybersecurityoxymoron/ [http://perma.cc/K8R8-RXS4].
27 John Evangelakos et al., Sullivan & Cromwell Discusses the Cybersecurity Act of
2015, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 6, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/01/06/
sullivan-cromwell-discusses-the-cybersecurity-act-of-2015/ [http://perma.cc/6ZG8-F8FV].
28 Data, Privacy & Security Practice Report – January 19, 2016, KING & SPALDING
(Jan. 16, 2016), http://www.kslaw.com/News-and-Insights/PublicationDetail?us_nsc_id=9483.
29 This Week the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act Is on the Senate Floor
& Apple Vehemently Opposes it, PATENTLY APPLE (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.patently
apple.com/patently-apple/2015/10/this-week-the-cybersecurity-information-sharing-act-ison-the-senate-floor-apple-vehemently-opposes-it.html [http://perma.cc/U6GM-H6NL].
30 The provisions described are from the version available in September 2015.
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cybersecurity threats.”31 Section 1 sets out the title of the bill as
the “Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015,” and
includes a table of contents of ten total sections.32

b. Section 4: Authorizations
Section 4 discusses authorization for preventing, detecting,
analyzing, and mitigating cybersecurity threats: subsection 4(a) on
authorization for monitoring, subsection 4(b) on authorization for
operation of defensive measures, subsection 4(c) on authorization
for sharing or receiving cyberthreat indicators or measures,

31
32

35
36
37
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33
34

Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, S. 754, 114th Cong. (2015).
Id. § 1.
Id. § 2.
Id. § 2(4).
SENATE REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMMITTEE, supra note 15.
Id.
S. 754 § 3(a).
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a. Sections 2 and 3
Section 2 defines various terms: agency, antitrust laws,
appropriate federal entities, cybersecurity purpose, cybersecurity
threat, cyberthreat indicator, defensive measure, entity, federal
entity, information system, local government, malicious cyber
command and control, malicious reconnaissance, monitor, private
entity, security control, security vulnerability, and tribal.33
Particularly, subsection 2(4) defines “cybersecurity purpose” as
“the purpose of protecting an information system or information
that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information
system from a cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability.”34
Notably, subsection 2(7) defines “defensive measure” as “an
action, device, procedure, signature, technique, or other measure
applied to an information system or information that is stored on,
processed by, or transiting an information system that detects,
prevents, or mitigates a known or suspected cybersecurity threat
or security vulnerability,” excluding “a measure that destroys,
renders unusable, or substantially harms an information system
or data on an information system.”35 The authorization to employ
defensive measures forbids an entity from gaining unauthorized
access to a computer network.36
Section 3 discusses the federal government’s timely sharing
of information through procedures developed and promulgated by
the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney General, in
consultation with the heads of the appropriate federal entities.37
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subsection 4(d) on protection and use of information, and
subsection 4(e) on antitrust exemption.38
Specifically, subsection 4(a) “[e]nables a private entity to
monitor information systems for a cybersecurity purpose.”39
Subsection 4(b) “[e]nables a private entity to operate a defensive
measure that is applied to information systems for cybersecurity
purposes and narrowly permits the type of defensive actions a
private entity may take.”40 Subsection 4(c) enables “a private
entity to share with, or receive from, any other entity or the
federal government a threat indicator or defensive
measure . . . for cybersecurity purposes.”41
Subsection 4(d) requires “an entity monitoring an
information system, operating a defensive measure, or providing
or receiving a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure . . . to
protect against unauthorized access to or acquisition of such”
information.42 Subsection 4(d) also requires an entity (i) to
“review information and to remove personal information not
directly related to a cybersecurity threat” before sharing
cybersecurity information, and (ii) “to implement and utilize
technical capability to remove any personal information not
directly related to a cybersecurity threat.”43
Subsection 4(e) provides for an antitrust exemption, i.e.,
there is no antitrust violation “for 2 or more private entities to
exchange or provide a cyber threat indicator, or assistance
relating to the prevention, investigation, or mitigation of a
cybersecurity threat . . . .”44

38
39
40
41

44
45
46

05/09/2016 12:16:02

42
43

Id. § 4.
SENATE REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMMITTEE, supra note 15.
Id.
Id.
S. 754 § 4(d)(1).
SENATE REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMMITTEE, supra note 15.
S. 754 § 4(e)(1).
SENATE REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMMITTEE, supra note 15.
Id.

37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 74 Side B

c. Section 5: Information Sharing
Section 5 establishes procedures for the government to
“facilitate cybersecurity information sharing not later than 60
days after enactment of the bill.”45 Subsection 5(a) requires the
federal government to “provide guidelines on the types of
information that qualifies as a cybersecurity threat indicator and
information protected under applicable privacy laws that are
unlikely to be directly related to a cybersecurity threat.”46
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Subsection 5(b) requires the federal government to provide
“guidelines relating to privacy and civil liberties that shall
govern the receipt, retention, use, and dissemination of cyber
threat indicators by a federal entity obtained in connection with
the cybersecurity activities.”47 Section 5(b) also requires the
government “to periodically review the guidelines and content
comprising cybersecurity information.”48
Subsection 5(c) requires the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) to “develop and implement a
capability and process within DHS to accept cyber threat
information through an automated system in real time.”49
Subsection 5(d) clarifies “that information sharing will not
constitute a waiver of any applicable privilege or protection,” but
rather, is voluntary, and “rights to proprietary information will
not be infringed upon.”50 Specifically, subsection 5(d) does not
allow the government “to use cyber information to investigate
and prosecute ‘serious violent felonies.’”51

47
48
49
50
51

54
55
56
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52
53

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, S. 754, 114th Cong. § 7(b) (2015).
Id. § 8(i).
Id. § 8(k). For a discussion on preemption, see Eric Lindenfeld & Jasper L. Tran,
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d. Sections 6 Through 10
Section 6 protects a private entity from liability “for the
monitoring of information systems or sharing or receipt of cyber
threat indicators and defensive measures.”52
Subsection 7(a) requires federal agencies to “submit
information to various inspectors general in order to examine
and oversee the implementation of cybersecurity information
sharing, including content, effectiveness, and privacy and civil
liberties.”53 Subsection 7(b) requires the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board to submit a report assessing the Act’s
effects and sufficiency to Congress and the President once every
two years.54
Subsection 8(i) exempts entities from liability “for choosing
not to engage in the voluntary activities” the act authorizes.55
Subsection 8(k) provides for the bill’s narrow construction and
preemption of federal and state laws.56
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Section 9 requires the Director of National Intelligence to
submit a report on cyberthreats to the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee.57
Section 10 eliminates a new exemption in the Freedom of
Information Act created specifically for cyber information; thus,
information shared through the bill could still qualify under
existing FOIA exemptions.58
2. CISA’s Cost
CISA needs about twenty people to “administer the program,
prepare the required reports and manage the exchange of
information.”59
The Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) estimates CISA’s
cost at about “$20 million over the 2016-2020 period, assuming
appropriation of the estimated amounts.”60 Also, the “aggregate
costs of the mandates on public entities would [likely] fall below
the threshold for intergovernmental mandates.”61
The Obama administration did not take a public stance on
CISA prior the passage of the CA’15.62
II. FROM THE HOUSE: THE PROTECTING CYBER NETWORKS ACT
A.
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Beyond Preemption of Generic Drug Claims, 45 SW. L. REV. 241, 244 (2015).
57 S. 754 § 9.
58 SENATE REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMMITTEE, supra note 15.
59 Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: S. 754 Cybersecurity Information
Sharing Act of 2015, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/costestimate/s7540.pdf [http://perma.cc/F7P4-8J6X].
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 SENATE REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMMITTEE, supra note 15. However, the Obama
administration has supported the House’s companion bill, H.R. 1560 entitled “Protecting
Cyber Networks Act,” in an administration policy statement. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 1560 - PROTECTING CYBER
NETWORKS ACT (Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/ legislative/
sap/114/saphr1560r_20150421.pdf [http://perma.cc/SZ74-JZS8] [hereinafter STATEMENT
OF ADMINISTRATION: H.R. 1560]. See generally infra Section II.B.1.
63 Protecting Cyber Networks Act, H.R. 1560, 114th Cong. (2015). The eight
cosponsors are Adam B. Schiff (D-CA), Lynn A. Westmoreland (R-GA), James A. Himes

37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 75 Side B

PCNA’s History
Meanwhile, the House responded to the escalating
cybersecurity threats with its own version of a cybersecurity
bill—the PCNA. Congressman Devin Nunes (R-CA), along with
eight cosponsors, first introduced PCNA to the House on March
24, 2015, and the House passed PCNA by a 307–116 vote on
April 22, 2015.63
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B.

PCNA in Detail
Providing strong protections for privacy and civil liberties,
PCNA essentially enables the private sector to voluntarily share
cyberthreat indicators with each other and with the federal
government, but not through the NSA or the
DOD.64 In
discussing PCNA’s provisions, I will also note similarities
between the PCNA and CISA.
1. PCNA’s Notable Provisions
PCNA’s purpose is to improve cybersecurity in the United
States through enhanced sharing of information about
cybersecurity threats. Section 1 sets out the short title of the bill
as the “Protecting Cyber Networks Act,” and includes a table of
contents of the eleven following sections.65 Sections 2 and 4
amend Title I of the National Security Act of 1947.66
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(D-CT), Peter T. King (R-NY), Frank A. LoBiondo (R-NJ), Terri A. Sewell (D-AL), Mike
Quigley (D-IL), and Patrick Murphy (D-FL). H.R.1560 - Protecting Cyber Networks Act,
C ONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1560/actions
[http://perma.cc/TT7Q-58MA].
64 See generally infra Section II.B.1.
65 H.R. 1560.
66 Id. §§ 2(a), 4(a).
67 See supra Section I.B.1.
68 U.S.
H OUSE OF R EPRESENTATIVES P ERMANENT S ELECT C OMM. ON
INTELLIGENCE, THE PROTECTING CYBER NETWORKS ACT: SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/new%20section%
20by%20section%20pdf.pdf [http://perma.cc/TZ9P-DLQ8] [hereinafter HR1560 SECTIONBY-SECTION].
69 Id.
70 See supra Section I.B.1.
71 HR1560 SECTION-BY-SECTION, supra note 68.

37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 76 Side A

a. Sections 2 Through 4
PCNA’s section 2, like part of CISA’s section 5,67 discusses
the sharing of cyberthreat indicators and defensive measures in
real time by the DOD and NSA with the private sector, including
declassifying the information and sharing at an unclassified
level.68 Particularly, the federal government must remove
“personal information or information identifying a specific person
that does not directly relate to a cyber threat.”69
PCNA’s section 3, like CISA’s section 4,70 discusses
authorizations for “preventing, detecting, analyzing, and
mitigating cybersecurity threats” of private and non-federal
entities. Particularly, “[s]ubsection (a) does not authorize the
Federal Government to conduct surveillance of any person.”71
Notably, subsection 3(b) does not authorize any defensive
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measure that “destroys, renders unusable or inaccessible . . . or
substantially harms” other networks, which includes “hacking
back” or other forms of cyber activities that use computers or
networks without their owner’s consent.72
PCNA’s section 4, like CISA’s section 5,73 discusses sharing
of cyberthreat indicators and defensive measures with appropriate
federal entities.74 PCNA’s subsection 4(b) requires the Attorney
General to outline privacy and civil liberties guidelines.75
Subsection 4(d) specifies the purposes the federal government
may use a cyberthreat indicator received from non-federal
entities:
cybersecurity purpose; preventing or prosecuting a threat of death or
seriously bodily harm or an offense arising out such a threat;
preventing or prosecuting a serious threat to a minor, including sexual
exploitation; or preventing or prosecuting espionage, economic
espionage, serious violent felonies, and violations of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act.76

72
73
74
75
76

79
80
81
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77
78

Id.
See supra Section I.B.1.
HR1560 SECTION-BY-SECTION, supra note 68.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Section I.B.1.
HR1560 SECTION-BY-SECTION, supra note 68.
Protecting Cyber Networks Act, H.R. 1560, 114th Cong. § 6(c) (2015).
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b. Sections 5 Through 7
Section 5 establishes a private cause of action as the
exclusive means for seeking a remedy for a violation of the Act by
the federal government.77 It provides for statutory damages,
reasonable attorney fees, and a statute of limitations for the
federal government’s violation of the privacy and civil liberties
guidelines under subsection 4(b).78
PCNA’s section 6, like part of CISA’s section 6,79 protect a
private entity from causes of action for the monitoring of an
information system or sharing of cyberthreat indicators or
defensive measures.80 Notably, section 6 defines “willful
misconduct” as “an act or omission that is taken (A) intentionally
to achieve a wrongful purpose; (B) knowingly without legal or
factual justification and; (C) in disregard of a known or obvious
risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that the harm
will outweigh the benefit,” and establishes the standard to prove
willful misconduct.81
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PCNA’s section 7, like CISA’s section 7, requires submission
of reports for oversight of government activities.82
c. Sections 8 Through 11
PCNA’s section 8, like CISA’s section 9,83 requires the
Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the
Intelligence Community, “to submit a report to congressional
intelligence committees on cybersecurity threats.” 84
Section 9 contains various construction and preemption
provisions to make clear that, essentially, PCNA does not
authorize the government to target a person for surveillance.85
Section 9 also does not “limit or modify any existing
information-sharing relationships outside of [PCNA] or prohibit
any new information-sharing relationships outside of [PCNA].”86
Section 10 amends the United States Code, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)
and 10 U.S.C. § 2224.87
PCNA’s section 11, like CISA’s section 2,88 narrowly defines
various terms: agency, appropriate federal entities, cybersecurity
purpose, cyberthreat, cyberthreat indicator, defensive measure,
federal entity, information system, local government, malicious
cyber command and control, malicious reconnaissance, monitor,
non-federal entity, private entity, real time and real-time,
security control, security vulnerability, and tribal.89
PCNA’s section 11(4) defines “cybersecurity threat” as:

82
83
84
85

88
89
90
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87

H.R. 1560 § 7; see also supra Section I.B.1.
See supra Section I.B.1.
HR1560 SECTION-BY-SECTION, supra note 68.
Id.
Id.
H.R. 1560 § 10; HR1560 SECTION-BY-SECTION, supra note 68.
See supra Section I.B.1.
H.R. 1560 § 11; HR1560 SECTION-BY-SECTION, supra note 68.
H.R. 1560 § 11(4).
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an action, not protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, on or through an information system that may
result in an unauthorized effort to adversely impact the security,
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information system or
information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an
information system[,] . . . [excluding] any action that solely involves a
violation of a consumer term of service or a consumer licensing
agreement.”90
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2. PCNA’s Cost
The CBO estimates PCNA’s implementation cost at “$186
million over the 2016-2020 period, assuming appropriation of the
estimated amounts.”91
Although the Obama administration publicly supported
PCNA,92 out of the gate, both bills, especially S. 754, faced
opposition from many organizations on the grounds of violating
privacy and civil rights.93 Names like “cyber-surveillance” were
tossed around.94
III. FROM THE PRESIDENT: THE “VOLUNTARY” FRAMEWORK
FOLLOWING EXECUTIVE ORDER 13636
As Congress considered legislation, the President in
February 2013 issued Executive Order 13636, entitled
“Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” directing the
NIST to develop a “voluntary” framework for reducing cyber risks
to critical infrastructure.95 Accordingly, the NIST released a
framework in February 2014,96 sharing many similar provisions
of CISA and PCNA on information sharing.97 Before the passage
of CA’15, Executive Order 13636 was the only serious action
taken by the government to strengthen U.S. cybersecurity, but
the NIST Framework is voluntary in nature, encouraging—rather
than requiring—action on the private sector’s part.
“The private sector faces a rapidly shifting terrain without
clear standards.”98 Following the Federal Trade Commission’s
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91 H.R. 1560, Protecting Cyber Networks Act, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (Apr. 13, 2015),
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/50110 [http://perma.cc/6XB8-KNL3]. The CBO also
addresses the small and potentially insignificant amount of “criminal prosecutions, which
could increase federal revenues from fines as well as direct spending from the Crime
Victims Fund,” and the possibility of the government’s liability “if an agency or department
were to violate the privacy and civil liberty guidelines required by the bill.” Id.
92 See STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION: H.R. 1560, supra note 62.
93 See, e.g., Consumer Advocates Letter to Senate on Cybersecurity Information
Sharing Act, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Oct. 21, 2015), https://cdt.org/insight/consumeradvocates-letter-to-senate-on-cybersecurity-information-sharing-act/ [http://perma.cc/SL4L-434Q].
94 See, e.g., Robyn Greene, Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 Is
Cyber-Surveillance, Not Cybersecurity, NEW AM.: OPEN TECH. INST. (Apr. 9, 2015),
https://www.newamerica.org/oti/cybersecurity-information-sharing-act-of-2015-is-cybersurveillance-not-cybersecurity/ [http://perma.cc/3JZW-VGWM].
95 Executive Order 13636: Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 9.
96 See id.
97 See generally WHITE HOUSE’S Executive Order, supra note 8.
98 Cybersecurity: Private Sector Faces Increasing Regulatory Risk from Agency
Enforcement and Informal “Guidance” Becoming Standard of Care, FEDERALIST SOC’Y
(Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.fed-soc.org/events/detail/cybersecurity-private-sector-facesincreasing-regulatory-risk-from-agency-enforcement-and-informal-guidance-becomingstandard-of-care [http://perma.cc/TZE2-E43J] [hereinafter FEDERALIST SOC’Y].
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(“FTC”) recent win in FTC v. Wyndham,99 regulatory agencies are
expanding “oversight through informal guidance and threat of
enforcement.”100
In October 2015, the Federalist Society and partners from
the private sector met to discuss current cybersecurity trends
and what the private sector faces in 2015 and 2016, as well as
the following questions:
Will the President’s Executive Order, and the NIST Cybersecurity
Framework, become the de facto standard for the private sector? Is
the federal government regulating through the threat of enforcement
by [the] FTC, FCC, and other federal agencies, instead of through
more regular administrative processes? What should companies make
of emerging agency “guidance” from agencies like the FDA, SEC, [the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration], and DoD, on
operations and innovation in areas like the Internet of Things, mobile
applications and devices, cloud services, [and] connected cars?101

IV. THE CURRENT LAW OF THE LAND: THE CYBERSECURITY
ACT OF 2015
On December 18, 2015, President Obama signed into law the
Cybersecurity Act of 2015 as part of the Omnibus Appropriations
Act.102 CA’15 contains the majority of CISA’s provisions, but with
three notable exceptions: (1) network operators have monitoring
privileges; (2) network operators can operate defensive measures;
and (3) network operators can share cyberthreat information
with others.103
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99 F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming the
district court’s decision upholding the FTC’s data protection authority).
100 FEDERALIST SOC’Y, supra note 98.
101 Id.
102 Everett Rosenfeld, The Controversial ‘Surveillance’ Act Obama Just Signed,
CNBC (Dec. 22, 2015, 12:34 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/22/the-controversialsurveillance-act-obama-just-signed.html [http://perma.cc/C4Z4-VYWJ].
103 Orin Kerr provided some context for the provider exception, stating:
The statutory surveillance laws . . . generally prohibit Internet surveillance
subject to certain exceptions. Each of the laws has what is known as the
provider exception. The provider exception allows telecommunications
providers to conduct surveillance on their networks, and if necessary to
disclose user communications, when it is ‘a necessary incident . . . to the
protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service.’
Orin Kerr, How Does the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 Change the Internet Surveillance
Laws?, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 24, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/24/how-does-the-cybersecurity-act-of-2015change-the-internet-surveillance-laws/ [http://perma.cc/6UXK-UD6E].
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The exceptions in CA’15 contain the following definitions:
(1) “monitor” is defined as “to acquire, identify, or scan, or to
possess, information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting
an information system”;104
(2) “defensive measure” is defined as “an action, device,
procedure, signature, technique, or other measure applied to an
information system or information that is stored on, processed
by, or transiting an information system that detects, prevents, or
mitigates a known or suspected cybersecurity threat or security
vulnerability,” but does not include “a measure that destroys,
renders unusable, provides unauthorized access to, or
substantially harms an information system or information stored
on, processed by, or transiting such information system”;105 and
(3) “cyber threat indicator” is defined as “information that is
necessary to describe or identify” the following item(s) or any
combination thereof: malicious reconnaissance; malicious cyber
command and control; a security vulnerability; a method of
defeating a security control; a method of causing a user to enable
the defeat of a security control; the actual or potential harm
caused by an incident; or any other attribute of a cybersecurity
threat.106
Orin Kerr has noted that CA’15:

Specifically, exception (1) contains unclear language that can be
“broadly” interpreted; exception (2) is “largely a retread of the
existing provider exception”; and exception (3) “expands on the
provider exception because the disclosure does not need to be for
the protection of the operator’s own network.”108
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104 Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 102(13), 129 Stat. 2242, 2938.
Information system is defined elsewhere as “a discrete set of information resources
organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or
disposition of information.” 44 U.S.C. § 3502(8) (2012).
105 § 102(7), 129 Stat. at 2937.
106 § 102(6), 129 Stat. at 2937; see also § 102(11), 129 Stat. at 2938.
107 Kerr, supra note 103.
108 Id.
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[S]ubstantially broadens the powers of network operators to monitor
and disclose beyond the existing provider exception and trespasser
exception. The new language focuses mostly on the purpose of the
monitoring and disclosure, with relatively little in place about the
scope of monitoring or disclosure (although there is a requirement of
scrubbing personal data if known). And it seems to allow monitoring
for cybersecurity purposes generally, including outsourcing of that
role to others, instead of limiting the exception to monitoring to
protect the provider’s own network.107
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On the other hand, Jennifer Granick has noted that the
language in CA’15 could trump forthcoming federal regulatory
efforts as well as state privacy laws.109
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109 Jennifer Granick, OmniCISA Pits DHS Against the FCC and FTC on User
Privacy, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 16, 2015, 6:09 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/28386/
omnicisa-pits-government-against-self-privacy/ [http://perma.cc/A3MF-CXG5].
110 See STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION: H.R. 1560, supra note 62.
111 At the 2016 Chapman Law Review Symposium, Denis Binder agreed and
commented that there “will definitely be constitutional challenges” to CA’15. For a
discussion on the right to privacy, see generally Jasper L. Tran, The Right to Attention, 91
IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2016).
112 See generally supra Part IV and note 103.
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V. CONCERNS, ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The NIST Framework following Executive Order 13636 was
already in place when CA’15 was signed into law. Given that the
Obama administration publicly supported H.R. 1560,110 it was
foreseeable that CA’15 would be signed by President Obama to
become the law of the land. CA’15 might be as good as it can get
with bipartisan and presidential approval—the best Congress
can do with the ongoing political gridlock.
I have several initial concerns. First, sharing information
does little to prevent successful cyberattacks, given that there
have been many already in place. For instance, in 2003, DHS
established its U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team to
collect and analyze data, but its results have been unclear.
Second, the process of sharing information with the government
and other private entities creates a new opportunity for more
hacking and information being stolen. Third, CA’15—and its
parent CISA—is still a surveillance bill that could use shared
information to spy on U.S. citizens. Fourth, CA’15 has not solved
the problem of incentivizing attorneys to disclose their clients’
information. Lastly, CA’15 will very likely face constitutional
challenges in courts; the battle of right to privacy in the realm of
cybersecurity is far from over.111
Instead of expanding the provider exception in CA’15,112 the
government should focus its efforts on tackling the lack of
incentive problem. New cybersecurity bills or acts are still
focused on information sharing, which the NIST Framework from
Executive Order 13636 was supposed to accomplish already.
Going forward, I leave with four ethical implications and
recommendations for practicing attorneys. First, attorneys and
corporations should carefully consider the manner in which an
attorney shares client information. Attorneys can share IT
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113 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 502 (“‘[A]ttorney-client privilege’ means the protection that
applicable law provides for confidential attorney-client communication.”).
114 See, e.g., PAUL R. RICE ET AL., ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE U.S. § 2.1
(2015–2016 ed. 2015) (“The attorney-client privilege is a rule of evidence, with an
importance long recognized. It protects the confidentiality of communications between an
attorney and client.”).
115 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
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information, such as the manner of a cyberattack, without
revealing too much confidential information, such as the content
of the attack. How to share such information matters as well; it is
better for an attorney to pick up the phone and call when
communicating—leaving no paper trail behind.
Second, an attorney sharing cybersecurity information with
a party who is not that attorney’s client—including the federal
government or others in the private sector—could result in a
waiver of attorney-client privilege113 and/or a violation of that
attorney’s duty of confidentiality.114 An attorney must guard the
privilege, as well as comply with this confidentiality duty.115
Even inadvertent disclosure of a client’s confidential information
could waive this privilege. Attorneys want to keep their clients
happy, and losing this privilege would not make anyone happy.
Even if confidentiality concerns are resolved, the attorney still
needs to ensure there are no conflicts of interest involved, which
is difficult when there are too many people “in the loop.”
Third, there is a lack of incentive for the attorney to disclose
his/her client’s confidential or sensitive information. There is an
industry norm of keeping the information of an attorney’s client
private. No attorney wants to deviate from the industry norm;
the client might mistrust that attorney and replace them with
some other attorney whom the client can trust. As noted above,
the current CA’15 has not solved this lack of incentive problem.
Fourth, the public announcement of a client’s confidential or
sensitive cybersecurity information could hurt the current
client’s business, and even result in an attorney losing future
clients. This is often due to how much loss a client has suffered
from a recent attack, or because a client was targeted for an
attack in the first place—scaring that client’s current and
potential customers. No attorney wants a reputation for leaking
a client’s information.
In light of the above recommendations, attorneys can still
share information when appropriate—exercising their best
judgment.
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CONCLUSION
This Article summarizes the legislative history, notable
provisions, and current status of CISA, PCNA, Executive Order
13636, and CA’15. The Article ended with four ethical
implications and recommendations. And the most important
take-away is: when in doubt, attorneys should not share.
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